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"Admissions against interest" is a phrase that is commonly used by lawyers,
judges, and commentators alike to explain the admissibility, vis-A-vis the hearsay rule, of
certain out-of-court statements made by either a party opponent or a now unavailable
declarant. Unfortunately, there is no such concept in the law of hearsay. This brief
article will first describe the requirements of the distinct concepts of "admissions by a
party opponent" and "declarations against interest." The article will then try to explain
the origins of the phrase "admissions against interest" and why it is simply confusing and
inappropriate to even use the term.
II. DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence Code provide that
hearsay 1 is not admissible "except as provided.' '2  Historically, hearsay has been
excluded because it is generally considered unreliable. The traditional method of
determining the reliability of evidence has been to require witnesses who provide the
evidence to testify under oath in court and be subjected to cross-examination before a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University; J.D.,
Ohio State University.
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) and Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2801(3) define "hearsay" as a
"statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) and Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2801(1) further define a
"statement" as "an oral or written assertion, or non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by [the person]
as an assertion." Federal Rule of Evidence 801(b) and Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2801(2) also define a
"declarant" as a "person who makes a statement."
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 802 specifically states, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress." Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2802 provides, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by
law."
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jury that can observe their demeanor as a way of assessing their credibility. Since an
out-of-court hearsay statement has generally not been subjected to this traditional method
of determining reliability it has been excluded as unreliable. 3 Despite this concern over
the unreliability of hearsay, it has long been recognized that not all hearsay statements
are inherently unreliable and that exceptions ought to be made for those out-of-court
statements that possess "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 'A and, thus, either
do not need to be subjected to cross-examination or are considered sufficiently reliable
on some other basis.
5
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence Code have continued
and refined this tradition by providing for four different sets of "exceptions" to the
general ban on hearsay. One set of exceptions applies even though the declarant may be
available as a witness. 6 A second group of exceptions applies only upon a showing that
the declarant is unavailable as a witness.7 A third category, which includes certain prior
statements by a testifying witness and admissions, or statements, by a party opponent,
are not actually referred to as "exceptions," but rather as not being hearsay in the first
place. 8 Since the statements in this category can be used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, and thus function in the same way as those statements actually referred to as
exceptions, it is best to view this category as a separate group of "exceptions." Finally,
both codes provide for a "catch-all" exception for those particularly reliable hearsay
statements that do not fit any of the other categorical exceptions.
9
3. McCormick on Evidence § 245 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed., West 1999) [hereinafter McCormick].
4. Fed. R. Evid. 803 (Advisory Comm. Notes).
5. McCormick, supra n. 3, at § 245.
6. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides that the "following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness" and then goes on to list twenty-three separate exceptions ranging
from present sense impressions and excited utterances to judgments as to personal, family, or general history,
or boundaries. Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2803 provides a similar list of exceptions.
7. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) provides that the "following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness" and then lists the exceptions for "Former testimony," "Statement under
belief of impending death," "Statement against interest," "Statement of personal or family history," and
"Forfeiture by wrongdoing." Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2804(B) provides for the same exceptions, except
for "Forfeiture by wrongdoing."
8. Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d) provides that a "statement is not hearsay" if the statement fits one of
three categories of prior statements by a witness or one of five different types of admissions by a party
opionent. Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2801 contains similar provisions, although it does not use the term
"admission" with respect to the latter category.
9. Federal Rule of Evidence 807, titled "Residual Exception" provides in part:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
Oklahoma Statutes Title 12, § 2804.1, titled "Hearsay exception-Exceptional circumstances," provides
in part:
A. In exceptional circumstances a statement not covered by Section 2803, 2804, 2805, or 2806 of
this title but possessing equivalent, though not identical, circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines that:
I. The statement is offered as evidence of a fact of consequence;
2. The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; anu
[Vol. 40:751
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ADMISSIONS A GAINST INTEREST
Both codes provide for an exception that has traditionally been known as a
"declaration against interest,''  although the Federal Rules of Evidence now refer to the
exception as a "statement against interest" and the Oklahoma Evidence Code simply
defines it without labeling it anything. The pertinent language, which is virtually the
same in both codes, is:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 11
The rationale for why such an out-of-court statement should be considered
sufficiently reliable to constitute an exception to the hearsay ban is that "people generally
do not lightly make statements that are damaging to their interests." 12 As the Advisory
Committee's Note to the Federal Rules of Evidence has stated, "The circumstantial
guarantee of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do
not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason
that they are true." 13 Thus the key to a declaration against interest is that the statement
be against interest at the time of its making.
III. ADMISSIONS BY A PARTY OPPONENT
If one party to litigation wants to introduce an out-of-court statement by the
opposing party and have that statement considered for the truth of the matter asserted, it
is clear that the statement would fit the definition of hearsay. 14 Although there has been
some disagreement over whether such admissions should be classified as "exceptions" to
the hearsay rule or simply classified as being outside the hearsay rule, 15 admissions by a
party opponent have never been excluded by the hearsay rule. Both the Federal Rules of
3. The general purpose of this Code and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
(footnote omitted).
10. McCormick, supra n. 3, at § 316.
11. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2804(B)(3) (West Supp. 2005). Oklahoma Statutes Title
12, § 2804(B)(3) also contains the following at the end of the section, which the Federal Rule does not: "A
statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other
individual implicating both the codefendant or other individual and the accused, is not within this exception."
12. McCormick, supra n. 3, at § 316.
13. Fed. R. Evid. 804.
14. Seesupran. 1.
15. "Morgan's view was that admissions are received as an exception to the hearsay rule." McCormick,
supra n. 3, at § 254, 136 (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 265-66 (Am. L. Inst. 1963)).
Wigmore suggested that admissions were unlike other hearsay statements in that the declarant of the statement
(the party opponent) "does not need to cross-examine himself." Id. (quoting John Henry Wigmore, Evidence
vol. 4, § 1048 (Little, Brown & Co. 1972)). In Wigmore's view, the hearsay rule is satisfied because the party
"now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion." Id.
20051
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Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence Code provide that "admissions by a party
opponent" are not excluded by the hearsay rule. The pertinent language is as follows:
"A statement is not hearsay if-
... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement,
in either an individual or a representative capacity ... .16
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence "admissions by a party opponent" are
excluded from the definition of hearsay "on the theory that their admissibility in
evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of
the hearsay rule." 17 As a result, the exclusion of admissions by a party opponent from
the hearsay ban is not based on the guarantees of trustworthiness inherent in the
circumstances under which they were made, but rather in the theory that the party
opponent who made the statement "does not need to cross-examine himself."18 As the
Advisory Committee specifically stated, "[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness is required in
the case of an admission."' 19 More specifically, a true admission by a party opponent has
never been required to be against the interest of the declarant.
20
An admission by a party opponent probably ought to be the simplest exclusion
from the hearsay rule. As one commentator has put it, "Under the federal rules, a party's
own statement offered against him or her is defined as nonhearsay. Period! It is that
simple. It need not be against the party's interest at the time of trial, it need not have
been against the party's interest at the time it was said." 2 1 And unlike a declaration
against interest, an admission requires no showing of the unavailability of the declarant.
IV. ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST
Although there may be times when their application may overlap,22 the law of
evidence clearly makes a distinction between the requirements of an "admission by a
party opponent" and a "declaration against interest." However, despite this clear
distinction, the law of evidence has unfortunately created a hybrid of these two concepts
16. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2801(B)(2)(a) (1993). Both codes also include the
following other types of admissions:
(B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of
a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). The Federal Rule specifically titles these provisions as "Admission by Party-
Opponent" while the Oklahoma Evidence Code simply defines the statements without labeling them.
17. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (Advisory Comm. Notes).
18. McCormick, supra n. 3, at § 254, 136 (citing Wigmore, supra n. 15, at § 1048).
19. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (Advisory Comm. Notes).
20. See McCormick, supra n. 3, at § 254, 138-39.
21. G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. Rev. 1, 83
(1993) (footnote omitted).
22. For example, a statement by a criminal defendant, confessing to the charged crime, would generally be
admissible as an admission by a party opponent under the Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). Since the
defendant would be considered unavailable at trial because of the privilege against self-incrimination and the
statement, when made, would have tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability, the statement could also
generally be considered admissible as a declaration against interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
[Vol. 40:751
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ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST
known as the "admission against interest." The obvious problem with this term is that it
erroneously suggests either that an admission must be "against interest," or that an actual
declaration against interest must also qualify as an admission, which in turn suggests that
it can only be made by a party opponent. Since it is clear that an admission does not
have to be against interest 23 and that a declaration against interest does not have to be
made by a party opponent,24 no purpose but confusion can be served by the continued
use of the phrase "admission against interest."
Although the precise origin of "admission against interest" is unclear, it appears to
have arisen from the early debates over the proper rationale for the admissibility of
admissions by a party opponent. In an important article in the Yale Law Journal in
1921,25 Professor Edmund Morgan explained and refuted some of the more common
theories that had been put forth to justify the general admissibility of extra-judicial
statements by a party. One theory was that such statements were treated the same as
judicial admissions in that they amounted to a "waiver of the privilege of requiring the
opponent to produce proof of a particular point in issue." 26 Professor Morgan dismissed
that explanation by pointing out that while judicial admissions were treated as conclusive
evidence of the point for which they were offered, the courts treated extra-judicial
admissions as simply evidence of the point stated which could be refuted by other
evidence. 27 Another theory was that admissions were not received as direct evidence of
the truth of the matter asserted, but rather as circumstantial evidence of the belief of the
party opponent in the facts contained in the admission, which "state of mind in turn
furnishes the ground for an inference to the facts which produced the state of mind.",2 8
Professor Morgan countered that this "process of double inference" would lead to the
same result as if the admission had been admitted for its truth, and that such an
application would be "altogether too tenuous for practical application" by pointing out
the difficulty in "attempting to expound it to the average jury!"
29
Two other theories, however, get to the heart of the confusion that has led to the
development of the "admission against interest" language. Professor Morgan pointed out
that some courts and commentators sometimes characterized admissions as declarations
against interest, assuming that if admissions "are to be received at all as exceptions to the
rule against hearsay, they must be brought within the exception of declarations against
interest."30 Of course, Professor Morgan also pointed out that admissions did not have
to be against interest when made and that the admissibility of an admission did not
require a showing of the unavailability of the declarant, which was a requirement for a
23. See supra nn. 14-20 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. Edmund M. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L.J. 355 (1921).
26. Id. at 356.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 357.
29. Id. Professor Morgan's skepticism about this theory accounts for the provision in the "state of mind"
exception to the hearsay rule in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), which excludes from that exception "a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed." For a criticism of Morgan's
criticism of the "double inference" theory, see John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 564, 579 (1937).
30. Morgan, supra n. 25, at 359. See also Wigmore, supra n. 15, at § 1049.
2005]
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declaration against interest. 31 Another popular theory at the time was that admissions
were "offered and received solely to contradict the position taken by the admitter in the
action '32 and that they simply performed the same impeaching function as a prior
inconsistent statement. 33 While it is true that such statements may sometimes have an
impeaching effect, Professor Morgan again made the point that courts clearly allowed
admissions to also be used for the truth of the matter asserted.34 So, it appears that the
"admission against interest" phrase may have had its origins in the inaccurate attempt to
equate admissions with declarations against interest. This confusion was further
compounded by the equally inaccurate suggestion that admissions were only useful
because of their contradicting effect at trial, which suggests that such admissions are in
some way against or disserve the interest of the declarant's position at trial. This source
of confusion seems to be supported by a suggestion in a 1944 Harvard Law Review
article that stated, "If a court desires to emphasize the disserving character of an
admission, the phrase 'admission against interest' is useful and less confusing than
classification as a declaration against interest." 35 Ironically, this suggestion appears in a
passage in which the author actually laments the fact that the "failure of courts to
appreciate the difference between these three exceptions [personal admissions, vicarious
admissions, and declarations against interest] has led to the development of inaccurate
terminology and confusing results."
36
Since the use of the phrase "admission against interest" has itself led to "the
development of inaccurate terminology and confusing results," commentators have
repeatedly warned against the continued use of this confusing and inaccurate phrase.
McCormick on Evidence comments that "the common phrase 'admissions against
interest' is an invitation to confuse two separate theories of admitting hearsay
[admissions by a party opponent and declarations against interest] and erroneously
engraft an against-interest requirement on admissions."3 7 In an aptly named article, Law
Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay, Professor G. Michael Fenner takes
modem courts to task for continuing to "get it wrong" by using the "admission against
interest" 38 phrase and thereby confusing the requirements of an admission by a party
opponent with the requirements of the common law declaration against interest. The Leff
Dictionary of Law defines "admission against interest" as a "common and confusing
locution which obliterates the important distinctions between a 'declaration against
interest' and a 'party admission."' 39 Professor Leff further laments the fact that "many
31. Morgan, supra n. 25, at 359.
32. Id. at 357.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 64 (1944).
36. Id. at 63.
37. Supra n. 3, at § 254, 138-39 (footnote omitted).
38. See Fenner, supra n. 21, at 83.
39. Arthur Allen Leff, The LeffDictionary ofLaw: A Fragment, 94 Yale L.J. 1855, 1945 (1985).
[Vol. 40:751
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lawyers and judges, to the despair of those trying to keep things straight, have the terrible
habit of referring loosely to both as an admission against interest.
' 4 °
Despite the fact that there is almost universal agreement, at least among those who
have thought about it, that the "admission against interest" phrase should be abandoned,
"the phrase continues to appear with embarrassing frequency. '4 1 A Westlaw search of
the phrase "admission against interest" reveals literally thousands of instances of its use
in cases and law reviews and other periodicals. 42 Even the United States Supreme Court
in Jaffe v. Redmond made reference to "admissions against interest by a party.
'A3
Although the use of the "admission against interest" phrase makes it unclear
whether one is referring to an admission by a party opponent or a declaration against
interest, it does appear that in the overwhelming majority of instances in which the
phrase appears it is used to refer to an admission by a party opponent. However, the
potential for confusion caused by the use of the term is starkly illustrated by the way in
which two frequently cited legal authorities describe "admissions against interest."
Black's Law Dictionary clearly defines the term as meaning the same thing as an
admission by a party opponent.44 Although it contrasts the concept with a declaration
against interest, Black's does not even mention the confusion caused by use of the
phrase.45  In contrast, though, American Jurisprudence ("A MUR") describes the
"admission against interest exception to the hearsay rule" as encompassing declarations
against pecuniary and proprietary interest, a clear reference to the actual declaration
against interest exception. 46 Thus, Black's treats an admission against interest as an
admission by a party opponent, while AMIUR treats it as a declaration against interest.
There is no question that the continued use of the phrase "admission against interest"
continues to contribute to this useless confusion.
V. CONCLUSION
It is as clear as can be that the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma
Evidence Code provide for the separate and distinct treatment of admissions by a party
opponent and declarations against interest within the hearsay rule. An admission is
simply the party's own statement offered against him or her. In contrast, a declaration
against interest must be against the interest of the now unavailable declarant. Under the




41. McCormick, supra n. 3, at § 254, 138 n. 18.
42. A Westlaw search ran on October 7, 2005 in the database for all state cases reported thousands of
documents. A search on the same day in the database for law review and periodicals also reported thousands of
documents.
43. 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996).
44. Black's Law Dictionary 51 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
45. Id.
46. 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 788 (2002).
47. Fenner, supra n. 21, at 83.
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